The English term "science" depicts what in other languages is usually referred to as ''natural science", sometimes also "natural science and technology''. Biotechnology can certainly be assumed to be part of science proper in this sense. An interesting and ethically highly relevant feature arises if one asks what properties people associate with biotechnology being a science.
Many people who are not scientists or who do not have a scientific training seem to associate the property of certainty and precision with something being a scientific activity. Also many decision makers whose activities relate to science, and the media often share this view. This association is occasionally invoked in the picture the scientists themselves provide of their activity to the public. There is a reason for this: if science does result in certainty and precision in the knowledge about our world, then it is clearly the case that public support and funding of scientific activity pays back in terms of a highly increased controllability and manageability of our technological and other dealings with the world. Given certain and precise knowledge of some sector of reality one is better equipped to predict what happens as the result of interventions and to avoid undesirable outcomes.
Interestingly, this picture of certainty and precision is often significantly modified when one follows the internal discussions of scientists. Practising scientists are usually quite aware that the knowledge they produce and the technologies resulting from it leaves room for interpretation and judgement in a manner that opens up significant uncertainties. Scientists also acknowledge that the precision they produce is normally a precision relative to certain intra-scientific goals, and does not easily translate to expectations of precision that result from an external wish to fully control a technology or practice.
In this paper I shall argue that the old "paradigm" of science, i.e. portraying it as an activity that in principle results in certainty and precision, needs to be replaced with a new paradigm according to which uncertainty and imprecision are an integral part of the scientific enterprise. In other words, even if science progresses and produces new and indeed valuable knowledge, this increase in knowledge will, typically, not do away with all or most uncertainties and imprecisions of the previous knowledge. Uncertainties may actually increase as knowledge progresses. We shall also point out that scientific uncertainty is a multi-dimensional concept that is still poorly analyzed and/or understood by many practising scientists. If we are to make progress with the ethical issues related to science and technology, biotechnology in particular, then we need to develop practical schemes on how to manage and communicate these uncertainties.
Historical note
Associating science with certainty and precision seems strongly related to the heritage of what is sometimes called the ''Newtonian paradigm". The claim can be made that our modem conception of science dates back to the so called Scientific Revolution of the late Renaissance and early Enlightenment (c. 1500-1750). Scholars of the history of science seem to agree that the example of scientific work produced by Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) and Isaac Newton (1642-1727) influenced the emerging view of what science is and how it achieves knowledge. This is certainly the case for what is termed the experimental character of the new science (then called "natural philosophy"). Galileo in particular was able to make important progress through his experimental method. Instead of simply being a passive observer of natural processes, he forced natural processes into an experimental setup where quantitatively precise measurements could take place. Think of the study of free fall of bodies through the experiment of an inclined plane. The whole point of experiments of this kind is to have as much control as possible of as many potentially intervening parameters as possible, and then to measure the quantity you are interested in. The results are then used to extrapolate back to natural conditions and to generalize the findings. What impressed the scholars of the Scientific Revolution -and one may want to add: rightly so -is the degree of precision that was made possible in this manner. Natural processes could be made amenable to the quantitative language of mathematics. From our modem point of view one may want to add that this precision also had a price: we first need to abstract from reality, to idealize certain conditions, in order to gain the precision that we then translate back to reality. Abstraction and idealization introduces some first uncertainties with regard to our grasp of reality (cf. Kaiser, 1995 Kaiser, , 1996 .
Newtonian mechanics was the central paradigmatic example that emerged during the Scientific Revolution and it influenced even our current understanding of what science is. Now there was a theory that comprised a number of important intended applications, such as, for example, free falling bodies and the movement of the planets, and captured them in a small number of axiomatic postulates. Given the Newtonian framework and some input observations, one seemed capable of caculating future states of the system under study. The Newtonian world is fully deterministic and-in principle at least-fully predictable. This provided a strong influence on several philosophers with scientific inclinations, for instance Rene Descartes (1596-1650). For him and some later materialist and empiricist philosophers, e.g. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) or John Locke (1632-1704), the world (including our minds) consisted of more or less complicated mechanical devices. Given a certain input, another output would result with strict regularity.
Newtonian physics has a great track record of successes, and it impressed many thinkers. The German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), for instance, took his starting point in trying to combine the undoubted great success of science as expressed in Newtonian physics with the sceptical analysis of causality put forward by David Hume (1711-1776). Kant's question was, essentially, how we can explain the certainty of science in the light of our limited epistemological "equipment" that our senses provide.
The history of science has moved on since then, and Newtonian physics now serves as one scientific success among many, and as one that has a rather limited application. Modem science has been influenced by, among others, Darwin's theory of evolution, Mendelian laws of heritage, Einstein's theories of relativity and quantum mechanics, Watson and Crick's model of DNA, plate tectonics, and so on. What is striking in this context, is that all these theories provide a rather different perspective on certainty and precision in our scientific knowledge. For instance, Darwin's theory of evolution seemed to provide good explanatory schemes of the emergence of different life forms, and at the same time appeared incapable of making precise predictions in regard future developments. In essence, in some senses, explanation and prediction were somehow de-coupled.
Philosophizing about science
There is not the space here to review the development of modern philosophies of science that emerged during the twentieth century. At the start of the twenty-first century there seems ample reason to claim that current philosophy of science has gradually left behind many (if not all) of the expectations that came out of the Newtonian picture of science. Thomas Kuhn's work The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) in particular is viewed by many as a watershed in the philosophical analysis of science. In it Kuhn challenges the picture of science that was based on cumulative and linear progress, he sketches scientific activity as problem-solving activity relative to a given community of researchers, and he questions various versions of the so called unity of science philosophy. Current philosophers of science, for instance Nancy Cartwright (1983 Cartwright ( , 1989 Cartwright ( , 1999 , Philip Kitcher (1993 Kitcher ( , 2001 and Ian Hacking (1983) -and in all modesty my own work (Kaiser 1991 (Kaiser ,1993 (Kaiser , 1995 (Kaiser , 1996 -present a pluralist and multi-faceted picture of scientific knowledge. While we indeed gain important insights through processes of experimental manipulation, abstraction and idealization, we may have to recognize that our knowledge of the external world will forever be characterized by inherent uncertainties and unavoidable imprecisions.
This philosophical development is supplemented by developments inside of science itself.
The first of these developments was arguably the emergence of the theory of probability and statistics and its use in scientific analysis. The existence of a well-organized public administration during the nineteenth century that registered births and deaths of its populace made it possible to study population dynamics scientifically with the means of statistics (Hacking 1990 ).
Statistics and probabilities are now central methodological tools used in many types of science, e.g. medicine. While statistical knowledge allows us to apply predictions to large numbers, it fails with respect to precise predictability of the individual components of the system. This is usually ascnbed to the incompleteness of our knowledge of those parts.
However, when quantum mechanics entered the scientific world, and with it Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, even this interpretation became challenged. Now it seemed at least possible that the external world could be dominated by stochastic processes that would not allow full predictabilty. In other words, the Newtonian worldview became challenged from within physics itself. At least some aspects of reality may thus be indeterministic and unpredictable.
The complexity of the world
Developments in other areas of science expanded and supplemented this picture of intruding uncertainties. Chaos theory is one such example. That fact that even some apparently simple equations could be shown to generate chaotic systems, i.e. systems that, while fully deterministic, do not allow full predictability, points towards inherent limitations of our scientific enterprise. Weather forecasts for instance are possible within the bounds of two weeks, but are impossible for the long term. This has profound implications for our capacity to control these systems or to manage and/or adapt our lives to them.
In ecology (including social systems) other developments related to complex systems have taken place that introduce further uncertainties. Biological and social systems are influenced by localized interactions that give rise to emergent dynamics and patterns at larger organizational scales. Interactions among different organisms in ecological systems can structure certain properties of the larger ecosystem. These larger-scale emergent properties, in turn, constrain the localized dynamics giving rise to a continuous iteration of influences across scales-small-scale interactions influencing large-scale properties that in turn constrain small-scale interactions (cf. ICSU 2002). For instance, interactions between households may result in structures like the emergence of clusters in a city (e.g. the favelas of Rio de Janeiro) which in turn can influence the large-scale dynamics of a city and cause major changes or even catastrophes (like e.g. uncontrolled crime). These again influence the interactions between households so that totally new structures emerge. Of all the theoretically possible states a given system may be in, very few are realized because of the relation between small-scale interactions and large scale constraints. This can result in multiple stable (equilibrium) states of the system, and the change between these states can be sudden and non-linear. The result is then an inherent uncertainty in regard to the dynamics of such a system.
Uncertain knowledge acquisition
The sources of uncertainty described above relate mostly to basic features of the system of reality that science aims at understanding and describing. The uncertainty is a feature of the conceptual outfit with which we try to capture these systems, if not reality itself. If we now turn briefly to the process of our knowledge acquisition, one immediately realizes that here an abundance of intervening factors introduce uncertainty. We mentioned already the process of abstraction and idealization in experimental work. For the purpose of illustration consider the task of determiniung whether a given substance is toxic to humans or not. Obviously there is no straightforward way to study this. One cannot test the substance by giving it to large number of humans over a long period of time and then determine how many have died from it and how many have fallen ill. After all, there are ethical constraints that science has to respect. One way around this is to perform experiments with animal models. Obviously, the reliability of such studies is largely dependent on a number of assumptions, e.g. that the metabolism and other physiological features of the animals are sufficiently similar to humans. It may always turn out that in respect to this particular substance the chosen animals are not sufficiently similar, but rather dissimilar. There are instances where such initial assumptions later were proven wrong. When testing the animals we need to introduce further assumptions, for instance concerning the appropriate doses and the resulting effects. We then need to extrapolate these assumptions back to human size in order to find a "safe dose". Furthermore, the question arises what we do when a small and statistically insignificant number of animals show certain reactions and others do not? How are we to rule out that individual genetic outfit may predispose certain individuals to significantly lower tolerance of that substance than others? And there are further complications: what if the substance in question has effect only in combination with other substances that are specific to humans (e.g. diet)? What one would like to have is a good understanding of the causal factors that trigger a certain effect. Typically, in vivo studies have a limited use for determining these causal processes because of all the intervening factors. We might want to proceed to with in vitro studies in order to discover something about the underlying causal processes. One must note then that there are already a number of abstraction and idealization steps involved in such a procedure. We reach for causal knowledge of a system, but we pay the price of leaving the system we are interested in behind and perform research in highly artificial settings. Features of the settings themselves may introduce uncertainties of a different kind, for instance, in the measurements we perform.
We do not need to follow this example any further to see that uncertainties indeed accompany or scientific research in various ways. This is not exciting news for many practising scientists, since they are bound to recognize it in their daily practice. Yet, the paradox is that many scientists and science communicators regard such uncertainties as not essential when communicating their work to the outside world. As long as scientists communicate only with their peers from within their speciality, one may assume that all others are, by and large, aware of some of the inherent uncertainties in their work. But for those with a practical interest in the knowledge thus produced the situation is significantly different. This can best be illustrated by a discussion of statistical type 1 and type 2 errors.
False positives and false negatives
Let us briefly examine the so-called statistical type I and type ll errors that any textbook in statistical testing mentions. These are also described as "false positive" and "false negati-ve" results of testing. A statistical type I error appears when the zero hypothesis (that denies a causal connection between the examined quantities) is rejected and the test hypothesis is accepted as true, while in fact it is the zero hypothesis that is true ("false positive"). A statistical type II error appears when one fails to accept the test hypothesis as true, and sticks to the zero hypothesis, when in fact it is the test hypothesis that is true ("false negative").
Methodological rules in research are such that one attaches great importance to avoiding type I errors. One would prefer to overlook a truth rather than claim a falsehood. Usually one sets a relatively high threshold for the acceptance of test hypotheses, usually at a 95% level of confidence. The probability of a type I error will thus be set at 0.05. There are less rigid norms in avoiding type II errors, but here one often operates -to the degree that this is explicitly mentioned at all -with values between 0.05 and 0.20. When this value is set at 0.20 it means that a researcher has an 80% chance of rejecting a zero hypothesis as false when it is in fact false. These values represent a standard production of evidence by way of statistical testing. It is easy to discover that behind such standards there are important normative decisions that may have great ethical consequences. There are certain ''trade-otis" in the different methodical decisions. Dependent on what sort of approach one chooses, one chooses at the same time what one considers as the most important considerations this study should make. For instance, the traditional practice of setting the high priority to avoid type I errors often implies that one risks overlooking processes that may be damaging, e.g. to the environment. When assessing a new technology, one would then place the burden of proof on the public to show that damage will occur, rather than on the producer to show that the technology is safe ( cf. Lemons et al., 1997) . The reasons for this choice are not based on scientific facts, but on a judgement of values.
This glance at methodological issues of statistical testing hopefully gives us a sense of the intimate connection between how we deal with uncertainty in science and what implications this can have for important value issues that may be at stake. As more and more scientific research deals with relatively complex systems and has the potential to significantly affect the important values that are at stake, it has given rise to the concept of post-normal science.
From normal to post-normal science
The philosophers Silvio Jerome Ravetz (1993, 1999) have introduced the term "post-normal science" to characterise major parts of the scientific enterprise that nowadays enters into our policy decisions. Aspects of epistemology and the theory of values are interwoven in such contexts.
One uses as a point of departure two fundamental attributes: system-uncertainty and involved values. The quality of the scientific expertise is connected to how one handles the inevitable uncertainty and how the values that are at stake are incorporated in the actual study. Funtowicz and Ravetz posit this as a radical new type of science by referring to the fact that in these contexts we cannot hope constantly to reduce or eliminate essential uncertainty. If we reduce uncertainty by, for example, concentrating on selected parts of the system we usually increase our ignorance and lack of control of the totality. Funtowicz and Ravents (1995: 265) present "post-normal science" in relation to other scientific expertise (where pure basic research is excluded) graphically-as is shown in Figure 1 . Funtowicz and Raventz discuss different examples of post-normal science, including the question of genetically modified (GM) food. In the beginning of its development this was considered merely to be a question of applied science. How could one transform the insights from the study of genes into some marketable products with designed properties? Soon one had to realize, though, that one was challenged by critical scientists who questioned whether the resulting organisms really would be sufficiently risk-free. NGOs in particular mustered alternative expertise and challenged the development by theoretical risk scenarios, some which were supported by uncertain evidence. At the same time the manufacturing companies stuck to established risk assessments and argued that no risks could be detected. This is what Funtowicz and Ravetz termed 'professional science', i.e. a situation where scientists acted like consultants and were screening the science for possible evidence to support their position. There is good reason to assume that the whole discussion about GM food products has now moved into the area of post-normal science. Here it is no longer the question of one risk assessment versus another. The question is rather what one is willing to consider a possible harm (or benefit for that matter), and whether there is any good to be found at all in pushing forward a technology that is highly uncertain and will benefit only a few. However one argues now, one is inescapably involved in deep-seated value issues, where there is, so to speak, no trace of "objectivity" left. For better or worse, the science of GM food is intertwined with ethical and political matters.
Therefore, Funtowicz and Ravetz -along with others, such as Brian Wynne -argue for so-called "extended peer reviews", i.e. a process of evaluation and a strategy for a "democratised" solution of the problem by including not only purely scientific experts. Here "stakeholders", those that are more or less directly affected (professional and industrial bodies and laypeople) become integrated in the phase of preparation of democratic decisions, rather than being represented only via the ordinary bodies of representative democracy. Quality assessment in post-normal science cannot be restricted to traditional peer-review, it should involve stakeholders and laypeople as well. Examples of this can be found in so-called Danish-style consensus conferences (see EUROPTA, 2000) .
The concept of uncertainty
What are the practical implications of our discussion for the working scientists? Risk assessments of GMOs is in many ways different from risk assessments of, for example, chemicals. We need to be pro-active, and thus cannot count on a large number of data collected over many years. We need to assess the risks before actions are taken. This is why we normally proceed step-by-step and case-by-case. However, more important in a moral sense is the fact that what we know may be insignificant in relation to what we do not know. In other words, the uncertainties involved may carry more weight than the knowledge acquired. This is why it is of utmost importance that we improve the way in which we make the involved certainties visible for the decision maker.
We may define the uncertainty discussed here as being "any deviation from the unachievable ideal of completely deterministic knowledge of the relevant system" (Walker et al., 2003) . Thus, uncertainty is not simply the absence of knowledge, rather an important aspect of it is the inadequacy of knowledge for certain purposes.
There are as yet no generally accepted ways to make visible such uncertainties in scientific assessments. One of the earliest schemes to do so was presented by Silvio Funtowicz and Jerry Ravetz in (1990) , and termed the NUSAP scheme. However, several other approaches have since been suggested. Currently the best approach seems to have been presented by Walker et al. (2003) , which depicts scientific uncertainty as consisting of essentially three dimensions (location, level and nature) that together make up an uncertainty matrix (Figure 2 ). The first dimension of uncertainty, location, describes where the uncertainty manifests itself within the model of reality that science produces. This can occur at several places. It may be due, for example, to the boundaries of the whole system (context) due to the framing of the issue. What is within and what is without the system is crucial for the utility of the model in solving certain problems. It may also occur as model uncertainty, i.e. the form of the model itself or its computer implementation. Uncertainty may also occur at the various parameters, such as data that are fed into the model. There are further places where uncertainty can occur in connection to location, which we cannot detail here.
The second dimension of uncertainty, level, depicts the various degrees of knowledge that can be achieved. It is not as if knowledge is a simple matter of either/or, rather it is like in a court where we are used to differentiate between different level of proof. We distinguish between, e.g. indications of proof, the balance of evidence, and near certainty. Similarly, we may distinguish between different levels of uncertainty in science. The frrst level is mere statistical uncertainty, where we fmd uncertainty in our data material, due to sampling error, or inaccuracy or imprecision of the measurements. The second level would be scenario uncertainty, which means that we are unable to provide probabilities for various possible outcomes. In this case there are a range of possible outcomes but the mechanisms leading to them are not well understood. There may also be other levels of uncertainty, namely various stages of ignorance, that are either recognised or total. In recognised ignorance we lack functional knowledge to describe a good model of the system under study so that we are thus unable to construct good scenarios. As the extreme we have total ignorance, where we even do not know what we do not know.
The third dimension of uncertainty refers to the question whether the uncertainties are due to a lack of knowledge or are due to inherent variabilities of the system itself. The example of complex systems has already been mentioned. Once we have a non-linear system with multiple equilibria points, we can assume that the uncertainty stem from the system itself rather than from incomplete knowledge.
Rather than attempt to give detail, it is sufficient to state that it is strongly advisable to make the uncertainties of genetic modifications visible to the decision maker as a crucial condition for the ethical regulation and handling of transgenics. Public decision making related to technological change needs ways to account for the inherent scientific uncertainties (Harremoes, 2003) . Without addressing the uncertainties in an explicit way, one fails to answer to most salient worries of the public and the decision makers. Uncertainty management and models to represent scientific uncertainty need to become a routine part of scientific education.
Conclusion
In this paper I have argued that scientific uncertainty is part and parcel of scientific knowledge. There is a need to acknowledge this in our conception of science, especially in the way science is portrayed in public policy. Uncertainties have always been a consequence of the way science extracts empirical information from reality through abstraction and idealization. By going beyond the Newtonian models, especially in studies of inheren-tly complex systems, modem science has added to the sources of uncertainties. The concept of post-normal science provides one way of accomodating some of the essential features of this new science. It also illustrates the need of a new democratized and value-sensitive quality assurance of post-normal science. New approaches are being worked out to represent scientific uncertainties to users. I would argue that this will be an important part of responsible science for policy. Science does make progress, but uncertainties will always follow advances in knowledge. The realization of this needs to be a part of training in the ethics of science.
